We study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two-period market given that agents arrive at dierent times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously. First period agents face a xed cost of trading across periods, and their decisions of whether or not to trade in the second period result in externalities relative to the agents arriving in the second period. Given the nonconvexities associated with the xed cost, competitive trading rules can result in ineciencies in such a market and, in fact, anonymity m ust be sacriced to achieve eciency. Ecient trading rules have a market maker (i.e., an agent who is given some market power and the right to trade across periods) who faces some competition within period trading, but not across periods. The ecient choice of who should be market maker can be made by auctioning rights to this position. If there is uncertainty across periods, then ecient mechanisms may i n v olve m ultiple market makers, and the optimal number of market makers depends on the cost of trading, level of risk aversion, and presence of asymmetric information.
Introduction
Many organized markets, such as the major world security exchanges, limit the number of agents who may execute trades. We take a normative perspective on the design of a market and study the structure of the rules of trade that result in ecient allocations in a simple two-period model. We nd that the ecient rules of trade exhibit specic roles for market makers.
We examine a market where agents arrive at dierent points in time, and introduce a constraint that is normally assumed away in a competitive analysis: agents can only trade with other agents who are present in the market contemporaneously. This constraint, coupled with a xed cost for a rst period agent to be present in the second period market, introduces externalities and potential ineciencies. 1 First period agents' decisions have an impact on the prospects of trade for agents who arrive later.
We begin by showing that if the second period market is competitive relative to the agents who show up in the second period, then the externality m a y result in Pareto inecient allocations. When deciding whether to incur a cost and come to the second period market, rst period agents consider only their own gains from trade and not the gains from trade of the future agents. 2 If one moves away from a competitive market, and for instance, gives one of the rst period agents some limited market power, then the ineciency can be eliminated. This sets the stage for the analysis of the optimal design of a market. We examine trading mechanisms which eciently ll the role of the market maker, provide the market maker with correct incentives, and implement ecient allocations.
Although our analysis ts into a large literature on market microstructure, it diers from the theoretical work in this literature in important w a ys. The previous study of market microstructure has been predominantly of a positive t ype. A number of authors have explored the outcome of some market game to be played between traders and market makers for a given set of trading rules. Such rules are modeled to resemble the trading practices followed by the major security exchanges. 3 Our approach studies the market microstructure from a more normative perspective. 4 We are interested in characterizing the allocations in an intertemporal asset market (where there are costs to being present in the market) that maximize societal welfare and structures of trading rules that achieve those allocations. We bring ideas and techniques from the mechanism design and implementation literatures to bear on this market design problem. In addressing these normative issues, our results tie back to the positive literature, since market makers turn out to play central roles in the optimal mechanisms we identify.
Our starting point is a setting with no uncertainty. We examine a simple two period world in which there are new agents born in each period with heterogenous preferences and endowments, so that there are potential gains from trade within and across periods. Agents born in the rst period choose either to consume their goods or to wait to trade with agents born in the second period. When they decide to wait and trade in the second period, they pay a xed cost for participating to the market. The problem of optimally designing trading rules is to manage the incentives of agents to guarantee eciency. Given the lack of previous study of the eciency of market making, this simple starting point allows us to outline a basic need for market making across periods. 5 We study how trading rules have to be structured to choose a market maker and give that agent the incentives to correctly choose when and how m uch t o trade across periods. The rst half of the paper is devoted to this complete information analysis.
Once the foundation for market making is built, we i n troduce uncertainty across periods and analyze how this can change the structure of the ecient allocations and optimal trading rules. We discuss several reasons for having multiple market makers as part of a Pareto ecient trading structure in the face of uncertainty across periods.
The results we obtain are summarized as follows:
Competitive (or even simply anonymous) trading rules relative to the second 3 A few representative references are Bernhardt and Hughson (1996) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , and Kyle (1989) . 4 There are papers that have explicitly compared various trading institutions. A few examples are: Demsetz (1968) , Madhavan (1992) , Gehrig (1993) , Gehrig and Jackson (1994) , Pagano and R oell (1996) and Bernhardt and Hughson (1996) . These papers however, compare specic institutions, rather than setting eciency as a goal and deriving the trading rules which realize eciency, a s w e do here. 5 The model can also be interpreted as an analysis of trade across dierent market locations.
period may result in Pareto inecient allocations, even in large economies.
The gain in eciency of a market making mechanism over a competitive mechanism can be signicant, and may increase as the economy becomes larger.
In designing ecient trading rules one needs to identify a market maker, and the role of market maker can be eciently lled through an auction. The market maker's monopoly power must be limited so that she can expropriate the gains from trade across periods but cannot expropriate gains from trade within periods. This can be done by providing other agents with the ability to opt for refusing the services of the market maker trading in a static competitive market.
Any mechanism that limits the market maker to only oering nonlinear pricing schedules (or more generally any anonymous schedule) can result in Pareto ineciency.
If there is uncertainty across (or within) periods, Pareto eciency may i n v olve multiple market makers, the number of which depends on the discount factor, the level of risk aversion, and the presence of asymmetric information within periods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model, and section 3 provides examples that illustrate the problems arising with competitive markets and the role played by market making in overcoming such problems. The analysis is then generalized in the following sections. Section 4 shows that markets that are competitive within each period (or, even simply ones that satisfy a weak anonymity condition) produce inecient outcomes for some economies, and section 5 shows that by properly assigning market making rights, and putting some checks on the monopoly power of the market maker, eciency can be attained. In section 6 we examine how uncertainty modies the analysis. Concluding remarks are in section 7, and proofs are collected in the appendix. 2 The Two P eriod Model
Timing
There are two periods, t 2 f 1 ; 2 g . N t agents are born in period t, and the notation N t denotes both the set of agents born at time t and the cardinality of that set. An agent born in the rst period can trade in the cardinality of that set. We use M N 1 to denote the set of rst period agents who choose to be present in the second period market (at a cost described below 
Cost of trading
There is a cost of being present in the market. This may be the opportunity cost of time, the resources needed to physically visit a market or any other cost associated with participation in the market. The cost is represented by h a ving an agent i 2 N 1 pay a xed cost c i > 0 i f i 2 M . T h us, rst period agents who choose to be present i n the second period market pay a cost c i , independent o f a n y trades they make. 6 
Preferences
There are two goods which are labeled x and m, where x is the good to be traded and m i s a n umer aire. Each agent i's preferences for consumption of (x; m) 2 IR + IR are represented by a quasilinear utility function 
Endowments
Agent i is endowed with e i units of good x; where e i > 0 for some i. We treat endowments of the m good as 0 for all agents, as these endowments are irrelevant i n 6 W e could add a xed cost for any agent to be present i n a n y period. This would complicate the analysis without changing the fundamental externality and eciency issues we are examining. This may b e a w orthwhile issue for future research, however, as it could raise questions concerning endogenous choice of when to trade. 7 At times, agents may be oered trades which set their consumption of x to be less than 0. We assume that an agent prefers any ( x; m) for which x 0 t o a n y ( x 0 ; m 0 ) for which x 0 < 0. This could be modeled by extending V i to have as range the extended reals and setting V i (x 0 ) = 1 for x 0 < 0.
the quasi-linear model. We permit unlimited short sales of either good in the rst period by agents who wait to trade in the second period.
Economies
Given N 1 and N 2 , a n economy is a list f(V i ; e i ; c i ) i 2 N 1 ; ( V i ; e i ) i 2 N 2 gwhich species preferences and an endowment for each agent and a cost of trading across periods for rst period agents. The set of all economies (satisfying our assumptions) is denoted E.
Allocations
Given any positive i n teger N, let
t xi = 0 and
An allocation is a specication of the agents in N 1 who wait to consume until t = 2 as well as trades for agents present in each period. Thus it is a specication M;t 
Pareto Eciency
In this quasilinear setting, (constrained) Pareto eciency implies a unique allocation of the x good. The allocation of the m good, however, is not tied down by P areto eciency and any allocation of the m good that respects the trading constraints can be part of a (constrained) Pareto ecient allocation. Thus, in characterizing Pareto ecient allocations we need only characterize the distribution of the x good and the set of agents who trade across periods, M.
Given an economy, w e refer to a (constrained) Pareto ecient allocation as an ecient allocation. An allocation is ecient if there is no other allocation in which every agent has at least as high a utility and some agent has a higher utility. In this setting the ecient allocation is characterized as the solution to: It is clear that an ecient allocation has at most 1 agent in the set M, since having several agents just results in additional xed costs paid without increasing the trade that can occur. 8 (We re-examine this in the face of uncertainty in Section 6.) Lemma 
Trading Rules and Mechanisms
We model trading rules as a mechanism, which is a specication of: a nite length extensive game form for period 1 with N 1 as the set of players and with terminal nodes that list net trades for each agent and agents who wait until period 2 to consume; i.e., a terminal node lists (t Given an economy, a mechanism induces an extensive form game. To be precise, xing an economy replace period 1 terminal nodes with the period two extensive game form. Payos to players at a terminal node of this overall game as a function of the (t For the following denitions x N 1 and N 2 . An equilibrium relative to a given economy is a specication of behavioral strategies which form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the induced extensive form game.
An allocation rule is a specication of an allocation as a function of the economy (i.e., a function from E to A).
A mechanism implements an allocation rule if for each economy i n E there is a unique equilibrium outcome relative to the economy of the mechanism which i s t h e specied allocation for the economy.
Motivating Examples
We n o w illustrate the externality and show that it is present e v en in large economies. Consider the structure of the trading rules at time 2. Suppose rst that, after a quick reading of a micro theory text, the market designer decides that trading rules should be designed so that trade results in competitive allocations. ). Furthermore, strict concavity implies that V (1) < V , so that the interval is a subset of R + :
How could the ineciency be avoided? A simple way is to designate agent 1 a`market maker' at period 2, by giving her monopoly power. In that case, she appropriates the full surplus in the second period and internalizes the externality. This results in an ecient outcome.
The presence of a`xed cost of trading' introduces a non-convexity which accounts for the ineciency of competitive markets. The main problem is that an agent i 2 N 1 who decides to trade in period 2 generates a positive externality for period 2 agents, who see their trading possibilities enhanced. The social return for market participation in period 2 of i 2 N 1 is therefore greater than the private return to agent i considering the xed cost of trading c i . H o w ever, agent i only consider private returns when she decides whether or not market participation is worth paying the xed cost c i : This results in a level of market participation in period 2 which is less than optimal.
To see where the non-existence of an overall competitive equilibrium occurs, consider the choice of p. It must be that p = V 0 (1=2) in a competitive equilibrium. However, for some c 1 (as in Example 1) this results in agent 1 not trading across periods, and so p does not clear the second period market. The competitive price in the second period would have t o b e p = 1 to clear the second period market if agent 1 does not trade across periods; however, at p = 1, agent 1 w ould like to trade across periods.
The ineciency could be avoided if agent i was able to contract the second period agents to compensate her for the xed cost before the xed cost is incurred (a`Coase theorem' type of logic).
11
Such a contract is impossible, since agents in N 2 are not 11 The contracting literature on the`hold up' problem has considered similar problems based on present when the cost is incurred. Thus, c i is a sunk cost at the rst time agent i can interact with second period agents. This leaves agent i 2 M with no bargaining power to recover c i .
To further explore conditions under which h a ving a market maker oers improvements over having competitive markets within each period, let us examine a slightly generalized version of the Example 1. The following example illustrates the ineciency of competitive markets when the size of the economy is large. waits between periods, as this is the only agent who trade across periods in an ecient allocation. Also, this is the relevant benchmark to determine if no agents waiting across periods is an equilibrium outcome.
Given one agent w aiting across periods, let x be the ecient consumption per agent in both periods (so x = N 1 =(N 1 + N 2 )). For it to be ecient for the agent t o trade across periods it must be that:
An ecient allocation could be achieved with a market making mechanism (Proposition 3, below) and this is the inequality the market maker evaluates in making the decision of whether or not to trade across periods.
Given that (1) depends on x
, w e provide a sucient condition for (1) The intuition is that agents in period 2 have large marginal utility from obtaining small amounts of the x good, and for any xed cost c , if there are enough second period agents, then it is ecient for a rst period agent to trade across periods. a v ariety o f c o n tracting imperfections. Here the opportunity to contract is only present after the relevant cost has been incurred (by the very nature of the cost) and so the contracts that agents can sign ex post will not solve the problem. Our focus is instead on how to design rules for trade (i.e., the market) to eciently align preceding incentives. Now let us consider the incentive that an agent has to wait across periods if that agent expects the allocation to be ecient, and expects the allocations to be as if they were obtained by trading at the competitive price in each period. That is, the allocation is as if all trade occurred at V 0 (x ). The agent w ould wish to wait only if:
This simplies to
(2) Notice that the left hand side of inequality (2) is precisely what the agent who waits earns only from trading her own endowment! That is, she is not getting any reward for any of the other trade that she is carrying across periods, since allocations are competitive at each time. This can result in an inecient decision, since she is not accounting for the substantial gains from trade that are realized by other agents.
To obtain a better understanding of when a rst period agent's choice to wait is ecient, we consider the cases and from (1) intertemporal trade is ecient if:
Notice that the strict concavity o f V implies 2V 1 2 V (1) > 0; so that inequality (3) is always satised for large enough N 1 : On the other hand, inequality (2) implies that a rst period agent will not wait if:
V (1): Whenever this inequality is satised, the competitive mechanism will be unable to implement the ecient allocation for large enough N 1 :
To understand the ineciency, notice that a mechanism which has competitive equilibria relative to the agents present in each period gives any agent precisely the gains from trade provided by his or her own endowment, but not any surplus from additional trading that they provide. With a large economy, the intertemporal gains from trade become substantial and intertemporal trade is ecient, and yet a rst period agent only compares his or her own gains from trade with the cost they must incur to trade across periods. Thus, the cost can be very small relative to the total gains from trade and still impede ecient trading.
The eciency or ineciency of a mechanism that is competitive within each period in this example depends on the direction of the trade imbalance across periods. Even with large numbers of agents in each period, such a mechanism may b e v ery inecient. In fact, the only case in this example where the competitive mechanism always leads to eciency is the case where the size of the second period market is much larger than the rst, so that any single rst period agent's own endowment becomes so valuable that they have an incentive to trade across periods without even worrying about the gains from trade available from other rst period agents.
The Ineciency of Competitive or Anonymous Trading
The ineciency illustrated in Examples 1 and 2 occurs more generally. That is, for a large class of trading rules and any N 1 and N 2 , there exist economies such that the competitive mechanism yields inecient equilibria. Before proceeding further, we rst show that the competitive allocations in the second period are implementable. Otherwise, the discussion of the ineciency of competitive allocations is only a hypothetical. The following proposition will also be useful later, as our`ecient mechanism' will use such a`competitive mechanism' as a component.
A Competitive Mechanism
Given a static economy of size N, the competitive allocation is the unique t 2 T N such that V 0 i (e i + t xi ) = V 0 j ( e j + t xj ) for all i and j in N, and t mi = p t xi where p = V 0 1 (e 1 + t x1 ).
A static mechanism 12 implements the competitive allocation rule if for each economy there is a unique equilibrium outcome to the mechanism which is the competitive allocation for the economy.
Proposition 1 Consider a static setting with N 3. There exists a static mechanism that implements the competitive allocation rule.
The ideas underlying the mechanism are simple. Agent 1 announces a price for trade. If this is the competitive price, (as in equilibrium) the other agents will then select their competitive trades at this price. If this is not the competitive price, then there exists a Pareto improving trade between some agent i > 1 and agent 1, relative to the optimal trade at that price for i. 13 Agent i can suggest this price and trade instead of a trade at 1's price. If some agent i suggests an improving trade, then agent 1 is ned (through an endogenous payment to an agent j 6 = i) regardless of any further choices. Agent 1 can then either accept or reject this suggested improving trade. If it is rejected then i is also ned, which k eeps agent i honest in suggesting improvements.
The proposition is stated only for N 3. If N = 2, then balance may be dicult to satisfy out of equilibrium, as there is no third party to whom nes can be paid. 14 For N = 2, the utility functions V i need to be bounded, so that a ne could be imposed which is exogenous. In the mechanism we employ for N 3, the nes are set endogenously and so utility functions can be unbounded and the mechanism is still balanced in and out of equilibrium.
Outside of its relation to the rest of this paper, this proposition contributes to the study of the implementation of Walrasian allocations (e.g., Hurwicz (1979) , Schmeidler (1980) , and Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1984)). The standard theorems of subgame perfect implementation (for instance Moore and Repullo (1988)) do not apply here since both endowments and preferences vary across economies. Hong (1995) 12 A static mechanism is any nite length extensive game form with N as the set of players and outcomes t 2 T N as terminal nodes. Given an economy this static mechanism induces an extensive form game (evaluating utilities of outcomes at terminal nodes), and an equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive form game. 13 Otherwise, V 0 1 = V 0 i for all i at the suggested trades which c haracterizes the competitive trades. 14 The mechanism can be constructed to be feasible, i.e., such that the constraint provides a mechanism for Nash implementation of competitive allocations when both endowments and preferences vary. Our use of subgame perfect implementation provides a simpler mechanism than the mechanisms in the Nash implementation literature. Our mechanism has features not found in the Nash mechanisms: it is balanced in and out of equilibrium, it does not involve a n y i n teger or modulo games 15 , and it delivers the correct outcome even when mixed strategy equilibria are taken into account. 16 Of course, our analysis is limited to a quasilinear setting, but the ideas behind this mechanism are extendable to more general environments.
An Ineciency Result
Although competitive allocations are implementable, w e know from Examples 1 and 2 that it is not always desirable to employ a mechanism that implements competitive allocations. Actually, the root of the problem in Examples 1 and 2 is not the competitive nature of the allocation in the second period, but merely the fact that it is anonymous. This prohibits an agent who waits between periods from realizing the full value of the welfare gain due to the waiting, thereby resulting in an inecient allocation in some cases. This is true more generally, as captured in the following proposition.
A mechanism has anonymous equilibrium outcomes in the second period if given any second period extensive game form (corresponding to a rst period terminal node with some M [ N 2 as the set of players) the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this second period extensive game form depends only on the preferences and endowments of the agents, not on their labels. That is, for any permutation of agents' endowment and preference pairs, the set of equilibrium allocations correspondingly permute. 15 See Jackson (1992) for an argument against the use of integer and modulo games. Our mechanism also satises a condition of Maniquet (1996) , which states that from any combination of strategies there must exist a nite sequence of changes to alternative strategies for which each c hange is weakly improving for the agent taking it, with the last element of the sequence being an equilibrium of the mechanism. 16 In the context of Nash implementation, several papers have explored the issues of what types of strategy spaces are necessary to implement correspondences such as the Walrasian one. Examples include Dutta, Sen, and Vohra (1995), Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato (1995), and Sj ostr om (1995). Although we do not pursue those same issues here, the mechanism that we propose uses sequential announcements and revisions of prices, quantities, and acceptance or rejection of trades. This distinguishes it from the canonical mechanisms in the literature which i n v olve announcements of preferences (or states) and other information.
A mechanism is individually rational if for every economy and equilibrium outcome, no agent prefers her endowment to her equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 2 Fix any N 1 and N 2 . F or any individually rational mechanism which has anonymous equilibrium outcomes in the second period, there exist economies for which some equilibria of the mechanism result in inecient allocations.
Since competitive allocations are anonymous and unique (in this setting), the following is also true.
Corollary 1 Fix any N 1 and N 2 . For any individually rational mechanism which results in competitive equilibria relative to the agents present in the second period, there exist economies such that all equilibria of the mechanism result in inecient allocations.
Actually, for this result the order of the quantiers can be switched so that the same economy results in inecient allocations for any mechanism that is competitive in the second period.
In the next section we show that ecient allocations are implementable if we sacrice anonymity. In particular, the appointment of a market maker is a crucial ingredient of a market structure that delivers ecient outcomes.
The Eciency of Market Making
It follows from Lemma 1 that a mechanism that implements an ecient allocation rule will have at most one agent trade across periods. Therefore, a mechanism implementing an ecient allocation rule must be able to identify situations where it is ecient t o have an agent trade across periods, identify the correct agent in those cases, and give the agent the proper incentives to trade across periods.
Proposition 3 There exists an individually rational mechanism which implements a Pareto ecient allocation rule. For the case where N 1 3 and N 2 3, the implemented a l l o c ation rule is also individually rational relative to the competitive allocations within each period.
The formal proof appears in the appendix, but we outline the structure of the mechanism here for the case where N 1 3 and N 2 3. If vetoed by a n y agent, the competitive mechanism is operated among the second period agents (and the market maker is excluded).
The idea behind having agents bid for the right to be market maker is that agents will be bidding based on the surplus utility they can generate from trading across periods, and the most ecient agent will be able to bid the most. The ne points of setting up the bidding are delicate since one has to set up the auction so that all of its equilibria have the ecient agent winning with probability 1. One cannot use a standard auction to achieve this. For instance, if there is only one ecient agent, then it can be the case that in any equilibrium of a sealed bid rst price auction an inecient agent m a y win with some probability. A second price auction has multiple equilibria -some of which do not result in the ecient agent winning. Details of how we design the auction are presented in the appendix.
A mechanism that implements ecient allocations also has to handle another subtlety. There must exist checks on the surplus that the market making agent can extract by w aiting until the second period. If the market maker could simply make unchallenged take i t o r l e a v e it oers in the second period, then the market maker would be able to extract not only the gains from trade across periods, but also the gains from trade within the second period. This would induce the market making agent t o w ait in situations where it would not be socially ecient to do so. The mechanism limits the market maker's power by allowing the second agents an option of ignoring the market maker and trading on their own. Thus, the market maker can only extract the gains from trade from the benet of having trade across periods. Since agents can veto the market maker's oers and operate a competitive mechanism within any given period, each agent is guaranteed a utility level at least as high as the one corresponding to the competitive allocation within the period.
Let us remark on the role of subgame perfection in Proposition 3. Given the two period timing, it is important to impose sequential rationality to obtain ecient outcomes. Otherwise, if rst period agents anticipated that second period agents will choose not to trade whenever a rst period agent w aits to trade across periods, then rst period agents would not wait to trade across periods regardless of the potential gains from trade. Such incredible beliefs are possible if Nash equilibrium is considered, but not with subgame perfect equilibrium.
Subgame perfect equilibrium plays an even deeper role in our results. In some cases to ensure that the ecient c hoice of trading across periods is made by rst period agents, such agents need to extract at least a certain portion of the resulting gains from trade in the second period. These gains from trade may dier across economies that have similar ecient allocations of the x good. If Nash equilibrium is the solution concept used in the second period, sucient gains from trade are not always extractable. A sequential structure plays an important role in making sure that agents trading across periods are suciently rewarded for the cost that they have sunk, and thus subgame perfection is important: Proposition 4 Consider a mechanism for which the second period game forms have no proper subgames and depend only on the (t 1 ; M )r e alized f r om the rst period game form. Such a mechanism cannot implement an individually rational and ecient allocation rule (or correspondence).
If the second period game forms have no proper subgames, then subgame perfection can have no bite beyond Nash equilibrium in the second period. The additional condition that the second period game forms depend only on the (t 1 ; M ) realized from the rst period game form, implies that agents trading across periods cannot`announce' (irrevocably) their second period moves in the rst period. Since there are proper subgames when considered across periods, such a n i n ter-period dependence would allow subgame perfection to have implications (beyond Nash equilibrium) relative to second period trading. The idea of the proposition is that multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out when Nash equilibrium is used as the solution concept, and some of the Nash equilibria do not result in sucient gains from trade to a potential market maker to induce the market maker to make an ecient c hoice. When subgame perfection is applied, a mechanism can be constructed (following Proposition 3) for which all equilibria oer sucient gains from trade to a potential market maker to induce the market maker to make an ecient c hoice.
We can also say something about the way in which the second period mechanism must be structured. One has to be careful in how one limits the market maker's power. In order to obtain an ecient allocation, the market maker has to have the correct incentives to wait across periods and this can require that the market maker price discriminate among agents. If such perfect price discrimination is eliminated, then the market maker cannot extract the full gains from trade across periods and ineciency may result.
Proposition 5 If N 2 2 and the market maker from period 1 is constrained t o a nnounce a price schedule (not necessarily linear) in the second period and each agent present in the second period then can choo s e a t r ade and price in the oered set, then there exists an economy for which all equilibrium outcomes are inecient.
Any set of anonymous oers that a market maker could make in our setting is equivalent to oering some non-linear price schedule. Ineciency from such a s c hedule results from incentive compatibility constraints associated with agents choices from the schedule.
Thus, there are two important breaks from symmetry in the ecient mechanism. First, as we knew from Proposition 2, the market maker must be treated asymmetrically (non-anonymously) from other agents. Second, Proposition 5 points out that the market maker must be able to make dierent oers to agents who have dierent characteristics.
Uncertainty and Multiple Market Makers
The eciency of having a single market maker across periods was due to the market maker's ability to correctly forecast how m uch of the good should be carried across periods. In the presence of uncertainty, eciency may require several market makers.
Uncertainty Across Periods
Consider economies where in the rst period there is uncertainty about second period endowments. A period 1 agent is able to see second period endowments once that agent arrives at the second period market, i.e., if she pays the xed cost of participating in the second period market. Alternatively, she can trade and consume in period 1. In such situations, the allocation of any rst period agent who does not wait to trade in the second period must be xed before the uncertainty is resolved. This introduces a benet to having several agents wait to trade in the second period, as it permits additional reallocation of goods. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.
Let N 1 = 2 and N 2 = 1 . Both agents in the rst period have e 1 = e 2 = 1 and c 1 = c 2 = c: The second period agent (agent 3) has a probability of 1/2 that e 3 = 0 and a probability of 1/2 that e 3 = 1. Agents 1 and 2 can trade in the rst period, and decide on whether to wait before knowing agent 3's endowment.
Consider the ecient allocation rule in this example. If both agents 1 and 2 consume, then total expected utility i s 5 2 V (1): If both agent s 1 a n d 2 w ait, then total expected utility i s 3 ( It is clear that the right hand side is less than the left hand side at c = 0, since in that case the left hand side is the optimal allocation and the right hand side is the optimal allocation subject to the additional constraint that the consumption of one agent is the same in both states. Furthermore, the optimal level of x does not depend on c: Thus, when c is raised from zero to , the inequality still holds.
The ecient allocation in this example has no agent w aiting for high values of c, one agent w aiting for middle values of c, and two agents waiting for low v alues of c. This pattern is true more generally, a s w e n o w explore.
We begin by c haracterizing the number of rst period agents who should trade across periods (referred to as`market makers') for each c in the special case where V i = V and c i = c for each i. In this case all agents are ex ante identical, which allows us to concentrate on the optimal number of market makers, disregarding the issue of who should be market maker. The proof (in the appendix) shows that total welfare is a concave function of the number of market makers, M. It also shows that total welfare is continuous and decreasing in c. These facts, coupled with observations tying down the optimal M near the extremes of c = 0 and c ! 1 establish the proposition. The intuition behind the proposition is that there is a benet of having larger M since one can smooth second period consumption among a larger group of agents. The trade-o comes from the cost of market participation. The intuition behind the concavity of total welfare in M is that the marginal benets from smoothing across agents in the second period are decreasing with the number of agents already present.
For the more general case, where agents have heterogeneous preferences and cost, the monotonicity of Proposition 6 may fail. Nevertheless, we can still identify the ecient market makers and implement an ecient and individually rational allocation rule via a mechanism that is a variation on the mechanism used to prove Proposition 3.
Proposition 7 Let the total second period endowment of the x good b e a r andom variable with nite expectation and positive variance. There exists a mechanism that implements 18 an ecient and individually rational allocation rule. If N 1 3 and N 2 3, then the implemented a l l o c ation rule is also individually rational relative to the competitive allocations within each period.
The idea behind the mechanism described in the proof of Proposition 7 is to have a single agent who has market making rights, say agent 1, who can then oer allocations to other agents. The agent's oers to other rst period agents can specify that the other agent w ait across periods. That is, the market maker not only oers trades in the rst period, but also oers other agents payments for trading across periods. As with the mechanism behind Proposition 3, agents other than the market maker can refuse the market maker's oer in which case the static mechanism is run.
Concluding Remarks
With uncertainty across periods, we h a v e seen that there is a reason why eciency may require several market makers: Having additional rst period agents postpone consumption to the second period allows for more consumption smoothing across agents after the uncertainty is resolved.
There are (at least) two other factors that may contribute to having additional market makers.
First, if agents are risk averse across periods, then they may c hoose to hold an inadequate inventory across periods from the social perspective. With risk aversion, a market maker cares not only about the expected gains from trade in the second period, but also about their distribution across states. Given an individual rationality constraint for second period agents, a market maker will have rewards from trading across periods that vary across states. For a risk averse agent, this variance decreases an individual's incentives to carry extra goods across periods with the hope of trading them. Additional market makers can share such risks.
Second, if there is asymmetric information between rst and second period agents, then incentive compatibility constraints may reduce the market maker's incentives to trade across periods. A market maker cannot expect as high a return from serving as an intermediary across periods, as she will not be able to extract as high a price in all states as in the symmetric information. The constraints introduced by asymmetric information will tend to reduce the benet of having a xed number of market makers trade across periods.
The overall impact on the ecient n umber of market makers of risk aversion or asymmetric information; however, is ambiguous. By reducing the benet of having a given number of market makers wait across periods, it may be that the ecient n umber of market makers either increases or decreases relative to the risk neutral, symmetric information case. The issues of risk aversion and asymmetric information suggest areas for further research.
As a last remark, our analysis has been in the context of a simple two-good, quasilinear model. This has made the analysis as transparent as possible (and has kept the mechanisms relatively simple), without playing a critical role in the results. It is clear that the negative results concerning the ineciency of anonymous or competitive markets is not limited to this setting, as the counter-examples behind these results are easily generalized. Also, the structure behind the competitive and ecient mechanisms (Propositions 1 and 3) are based on straightforward intuitions and are generalizablewith the main complications coming in the bidding stages (that endogenize the nes or the role of the market maker), but with little in terms of other changes. Proof of Proposition 1: Let F P i V i (x comp i ) V i (e i ) where x comp is the competitive allocation of the x good, and choose any > 0. First, we show that for such a n F the following mechanism fully implements the competitive allocation. After establishing this, we augment the mechanism so that in the unique equilibrium outcome, F is revealed in a rst stage and then the mechanism is played.
Let j(i) = i + 1 i f i < N and j(N) = N 1. Proof: This follows from Lemma 3. To be careful in verifying that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium continuation, one has to check that there is an equilibrium continuation in each proper subgame, including those o the equilibrium path. This follows from the uniqueness of the optimal trade at any price, and the discrete choice of`Yes' or`No'.
Lemma 5 Fix an economy. If p 1 6 = p comp , then in any subgame perfect equilibrium continuation (and at least one exists) agent 1 is worse o than at the competitive allocation.
Proof: Given that agents other than 1 can always ask for 0 trades, the trades (not including ne revenues to any j(i)) in any equilibrium continuation must provide each agent with at least the utility of their endowment. This means that 1's continuation utility is at most P i V i (x comp i ) V i (e i ) less any nes that are paid, since the competitive equilibrium maximizes the total gains from trade. Given that i pays 2F in nes if any i is reached, in that case agent 1 i s w orse o than at the competitive allocation. We show that every equilibrium continuation must have some i reached. Suppose the contrary and let us show that there is some i who strictly gains by triggering i . F or each k 6 = i let t k be the utility maximizing trade given the price p 1 . There exists i and p i ;t i which strictly improves both i and 1 compared to the optimal trade for i at p 1 , anticipating announcements of t k by k 6 = i. This follows since p 1 is not the competitive price, and so there exists i such that V 0 i (e i + t i ) 6 = V 0 1 (e 1 + t 1 ), where t i is i's optimal trade at p 1 and t 1 is agent 1's trade to balance all other agents' optimal trades at p 1 . Any such i can strictly benet by deviating and announcing such p i ;t i (triggering i ), given the anticipated announcements of t k by k 6 = i.
To complete the proof of the lemma, we need to verify that there exists an equilibrium continuation given that p 1 6 = p comp . Given the existence of an optimal trade for any agent a t a n y given price, and the discrete choice of`Yes' or`No', we need only check that for each agent there is an optimal p i ;t i , should they choose to announce one. Let agent 1 s a ỳ Y es' whenever indierent given the anticipated announcements of t k by each k. T h us, i is faced with choosing a trade to maximize i's utility, subject to the constraint of oering 1 a utility of at least that from balancing all of the trades (including i's) t k at p 1 and to the additional constraint of announcing p i 6 = p 1 . I f w e ignore this last constraint it is clear that, given the convexity of preferences, this has a solution. If the solution has p i 6 = p 1 , then we are ne. If the solution has p i = p 1 , then there is an equilibrium continuation where i does not trigger i , but instead simply announces an optimal t i in response to p 1 . This is the best that i could have hoped for under any continuation where i would be triggered, given that the optimal p i = p 1 .
Next, let us examine the augmented mechanism that in equilibrium reveals the ne Suppose that all equilibria of the given mechanism relative to both of these economies (for each specication of c and V ) are ecient.
Consider economy A and any c where it is ecient t o h a v e trade across periods. Given trade across periods, the ecient x amount is 1 for all agents. Consider any equilibrium in the second period and the amount o f m transferred from 0 to 2. Let U 2 be any equilibrium utility for agent 2 if no trade occurs across periods. In order to have an ecient c hoice by agent 2 for any c, i t m ust be that m is precisely The left hand side is the surplus that would be generated from trade across periods if agents 0 and 2 were the only agents. The right hand side has the total surplus from trade across periods from both economies we h a v e considered. If V is approximately V (x) = min(1; x ) (adjusted to be strictly concave), then approximately 2V (1) If N 1 = 1, then it is autarchy. If N 1 = 2, then agent 1 makes a take i t o r l e a v e it oer of a trade to agent 2 , a n d then agent 2 can accept or reject. If N 1 3, then run the competitive mechanism described in Proposition 1. Game B This is the same as A , replacing N 2 for N 1 , and excluding the market maker if she is present.
Let us show that this mechanism implements an ecient allocation. It is clear that once an agent i has obtained market making rights the only outcome in the two periods is the one that extracts from the other agents as much surplus as possible under the constraint that each agent obtains at least as much as in the static equilibrium of the corresponding A or B , and that this results in an ecient allocation subject to i being the only agent who can trade across periods. The only problem is to show that the right agent obtains market making rights at the bidding stage.
Let S i be the maximal surplus that agent i can extract if she gets MM rights. That is, S i is the dierence between the total welfare of the ecient allocation subject to only having i able to trade across periods, and the allocation found by running A in the rst period and B in the second period, with no trade across periods. At the bidding stage every agent i < N 1 bids exactly S i : If this were not so, then agent i + 1 could nd b such that at game G( b; i; i + 1) agent i chooses market making rights and i + 1 obtains a larger payo.
This implies that if the agent with the highest S i has index less than N this agent obtains market making rights. If S N is the highest, then agent N will announce max i6 =N S i and will obtain market making rights. 19 Proof of Proposition 4. We oer the proof for the case where N 1 = N 2 = 1. Agent 1 is the rst period agent, and agent 2 is the second period agent. This easily extends to more agents.
Suppose that there exists a mechanism satisfying the conditions of the Proposition which does implement an individually rational and ecient allocation correspondence. Consider economies where: e 1 = 1 and e 2 = 0 , c 1 is either 1 or 2, agent 1 has preferences V 1 , and agent 2 has either preferences V 2 or V 2 . 19 We are using the tie-breaking rule assigning the right to the highest index in case of identical bids. 
The inequalities imply that intertemporal trade is always ecient when agent 2's preferences are described by V 2 : When preferences are described by V 2 then intertemporal trade is ecient i f c 1 = 1 and inecient i f c 1 = 2 :
Consider the economy with c 1 = 1 and V 2 , and an equilibrium which results in an individually rational and ecient allocation. The allocation for agent 2 m ust be of the form ( 1 2 ; m), where 0 < m V ( 1 2 ). Next, consider the economy with c 1 = 2 and V 2 . Here, since the equilibrium allocation is ecient, agent 1 m ust wait to trade across periods. Consider the second period game form given that agent 1 has waited. There cannot exist an equilibrium with an allocation for agent 2 o f ( Proof of Proposition 7: We briey describe the implementing mechanism. It is a simple variation of the mechanism in the proof of Proposition 3. The proof of implementation is then a simple variation on the proof in Proposition 3.
Designate agent 1 2 N 1 to be market maker. Run The only dierence from the proof of proposition 3 is that agents i 2 M correctly anticipate their expected utilities under the equilibrium continuation, and make decisions in period 1 based on whether these are at least what they would get from A . (The agents in M know that in the second period agent i will extract any surplus above their current holdings (e i +t 1 xi ; t 1 mi ). Thus, in eect, agent 1 p a ys them`up front' for waiting until the second period.) The market maker again will appropriate the full surplus over the running of mechanisms A and B . T h us, she has the incentives to choose the correct M. The rest of the proof is then identical to that in proposition 3, except that we do not need to worry about the selection of a market maker.
